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ABSTRACT – The benefits of international diversification have been well documented over the 
last decades. Despite this however, investors seem unwilling to exploit this opportunity in order to 
limit the risk of their portfolio and they continue to invest the largest percentage of their wealth in 
domestic assets. This phenomenon is called the Home Bias Puzzle and the given explanations for it 
have not been empirically proven to justify its existence.   
The purpose of this paper is to present a literature review on the opinions and possible 
explanations about the home bias puzzle. Furthermore, concluding, it will try to answer whether the 
home bias puzzle is a puzzle or not. 
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Introduction 
Harry Markowitz (1952) was the first to identify the benefits of investing in a portfolio of 
assets rather than just in one asset. Markowitz’s mean variance portfolio theory was based in 
two principles, holding constant variance and maximizing expected return, or inversely 
holding constant return and minimizing variance. According to these two principles, an 
efficient frontier was constructed and an investor could choose his preferred portfolio on the 
basis of his own risk and return preferences. Grubel (1968) extended Markowitz’s portfolio 
theory suggesting that portfolios should diversify internationally. Also, Levy and Sarnat 
(1970) showed that correlations among security returns are the key element for reducing risk. 
When correlations among securities are low, investors could substantially reduce the 
systematic risk. International diversification principles state that the correlation among 
international markets are low so one could diversify its portfolio more effectively than just 
domestically, i.e. the investors could succeed the same or higher returns with lower risk. 
However, as relevant research shows, investors do not diversify their portfolios 
internationally and if they do, they do it in a small percentage. The investors’ behavior of 
investing heavily in domestic assets instead of diversifying their portfolio internationally is 
called the home bias puzzle. Some of the possible explanations given for the home bias 
puzzle are: inflation hedging motives, institutional barriers, taxes on international 
investments and transaction costs, non traded goods, asymmetric information and others. 
However none of the given explanation has been proved to explain entirely this puzzle.  
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The Home Bias puzzle 
Over the last years, barriers and costs in international investments have fallen 
dramatically. Thus, one would expect that investors would take advantage of it and diversify 
their portfolio internationally and hold the world market portfolio of stocks. However, this is 
not the case, foreign ownership of equity remains rather low. French and Poterba (1991), 
Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) and Tesar and Werner (1995) show that there still a strong home 
bias in investors’ behaviour. According to French and Poterba (1991) the domestic ownership 
shares in the 1989 for the world’s five largest stock markets were: US 92.2%, Japan 95.7%, UK 
92%, Germany 79% and France 89.4%. The question arising at this point is why investors 
heavily concentrate their investments in domestic assets, since international diversification 
offers significant benefits to the limitation of a portfolio’s risk. Over the years, many 
researchers have tried to answer that question and to provide a logical and supported 
solution for the existence of the home bias puzzle. However, none of the given explanation 
has been proved to be the correct one. The most common explanations for this attitude of the 
investors are: asymmetric information, non traded assets, inflation hedging, several costs and 
barriers in equity trading, differences in expectations and empirical measurement problems.  
Differences in expectations and asymmetric information 
A possible explanation of the home bias puzzle is investors’ behaviour and beliefs. 
French and Poterba (1991) suggested that one possible reason for the home bias of investors 
is their optimism. Their optimism that can beat their domestic market but not the foreign 
market or that can hedge inflation risks. Similarly, investors are pessimistic as regarding 
foreign markets. Furthermore, their perception of foreign markets as riskier, because of the 
lack of information they have on them, drives investors to heavily invest in domestic assets.  
The last one is the hypothesis of asymmetric information and states that investors invest 
in the securities they know more about. As Solnik (1996) suggested, everything unknown is 
perceived as risky. The same stands for financial markets which investors are not familiar 
with. So, if investors do not hold enough information about a market, they simply won’t 
invest to it. Gehrig (1993), introducing a simple noisy rational expectations model, showed 
that even in equilibrium, investors remain incompletely informed. Furthermore, foreign 
assets seemed to be riskier than the domestic ones even without the foreign exchange rate 
risk. For this reason, according to the researcher, investors prefer to heavily invest in 
domestic assets and that is what generates the home bias puzzle. Other researches 
supporting that asymmetric information plays an important role in risk perception are those 
of Kang and Stulz (1997), Brennan and Cao (1997) and Coval and Moskowitz (1999). 
Coval and Moskowitz (1999) extended the home bias phenomenon to domestic portfolios 
as well. They suggested that domestic investors prefer to invest to companies close to them. 
More specifically, according to their research, US fund managers seem to be willing to invest 
more in locally headquartered firms. That is because managers had more information on 
these companies rather than on firms located in other states. So, asymmetric information 
plays an important role in the investing preferences of even among local and non-local 
investors. 
   




Similarly, Brennan and Cao (1997) developed a model of equity portfolio flows that was 
based in informational differentials among domestic and foreign investors. More specifically 
they used a dynamic generalization of the noisy rational expectations model of Hellwing 
(1980), developed to a multi-asset setting by Admati (1985). The main assumption of the 
model was that domestic investors are more informed about the domestic market than 
foreign investors. As the previous researchers, Brennan and Cao suggested that asymmetric 
information plays an important role in risk perception and portfolio formulation. 
Another research by Kang and Stulz (1997) showed that foreign investors in Japan prefer 
to invest in well- know manufacturing firms, large firms, and firms with good accounting 
performance and low leverage instead of holding the Japanese market portfolio. The 
researchers took data for the period 1975-1991 on Japanese firms. Their results indicated that 
foreign investors, investing in Japan, hold 13.7% more in manufacturing firms than in the 
market portfolio, even though their returns were not greater than those of the market 
portfolio. Furthermore, the volatility of their monthly return was 5.38% instead of 4.81% of 
the market portfolio. This phenomenon occurs because foreign investors do not have the 
same amount of information for the domestic companies as domestic investors have, and 
especially regarding small firms. So, foreign investors tend to invest more on firms that are 
relatively known and export their products even though these firms might be more risky and 
less performing than the market portfolio. 
Non traded goods 
Another possible explanation of the home bias puzzle is that the presence of non-tradable 
goods leads investors to bias their portfolios to domestic assets. Non-tradable goods account 
approximately for 50% of aggregate consumption in modern economies. Serat (1995) 
developed a continuous-time dynamic equilibrium model with two agents in complete 
markets, two tradable goods and two non-tradable goods. Serat’s results indicated that the 
agents hedge consumption risk of non-tradable by investing in home tradable goods. That, 
according to the researcher, explains the home bias of the investors.   
Baxter and Jermann (1997) suggested that hedging for human capital risk can be a factor, 
though not so important, for the home bias of investors. According to them, human capital 
represents a large proportion of national income and is likely to be highly correlated to the 
returns of the domestic marketable assets. Furthermore, their results suggest that diversified 
portfolios should short domestic tradable assets and take long positions in foreign tradable 
assets. 
However another research by Baxter et al. (1998) suggested that, generally, the presence 
of non trade goods is not the reason that causes investors’ home bias. Their model is a multi-
country equilibrium model with complete security markets and individuals in each country 
value two consumption goods, one for traded and one for non-traded. These goods enter 
together to the individual’s utility function. Also, the transportation of the traded good is 
costless and the residents of each country must consume all the endowments of non-traded 
goods. Furthermore, the endowments of both goods are stochastic. The researchers after they 
characterize the optimal consumption allocations and determine the supporting, for these 
allocations, portfolio holdings come to the conclusion that even with the presence of non-
   Economic Analysis (2010, Vol. 43, No. 3-4, 7-14)
 
10
traded consumption goods, the benefits from international diversification would be very 
important. 
Finally, Coёn (2001) tested, by using wage as a proxy, whether human capital in an 
international capital asset pricing model could explain home bias. Their results showed that 
this could not be the case and the researchers suggested that asymmetric information 
between domestic and foreign investors could more likely explain the home bias puzzle. 
Inflation hedging 
One of the given explanations of the home bias puzzle is that investors prefer to hold 
domestic assets in order to hedge against inflation risks. However, there is no documented 
close relationship between the returns of the equities and the rate of inflation. Though, Solnik 
(1978) suggested that investors try to hedge property costs and not general inflation. That is 
because price indexes, which measure general inflation, do not take into consideration the 
relative price changes. And general inflation might differ from inflation in the property costs. 
So, domestic equity may be correlated with domestic property costs, and not inflation and 
hedge better these relative price changes than foreign equity. And thus investors prefer 
investing in domestic assets. However, this hypothesis has not been tested and empirically 
proved. 
The researches by Adler and Dumas (1983) and Uppal (1993) suggest that the deviations 
from PPP (purchasing power parity) could lead investors to strongly invest in domestic 
assets in order to hedge different inflation. Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) used data of foreign 
equity holding from 8 countries in order to test whether hedging could explain home bias. 
Their results indicate that such hypothesis does not stand and in some cases hedging is to the 
opposite direction towards to explaining home bias. 
Taxes, transaction costs and barriers to equity trading 
Another possible explanation of the home bias puzzle is the costs of cross-border 
investing. These consist of taxes, like withholding taxes, and various transaction costs. 
However, as Cooper and Kaplanis (1994) suggest the costs for such investments could not be 
the case for the home bias puzzle. Specifically, Ahearne et al. (2004) suggest that 
informational costs are an indirect barrier of international diversification and one of the most 
important factors behind investors’ home bias. Also according to their results, when the 
direct barriers of international diversification were statistically significant, their economic 
importance was insignificant. 
Another research by Carmichael and Coёn (2003) suggests that transaction costs can be 
the explanation for the home bias in investors’ portfolios. More specifically the researchers, 
by using a simple overlapping generations model, showed that in a world with no barriers in 
international investments, the induction of even a very small transaction cost, i.e. existing 
taxes, informational costs or other constraints, can generate a home bias in portfolio 
holdings. 
Finally, Tesar and Werner (1995) examined the investment pattern of five OECD 
countries in the long run. They found that the turnover of foreign equity investments is 
higher than the turnover in domestic equity markets. This research shows that transaction 
costs or barriers in equity trading cannot be the case for the home bias of investors. 
   




Empirical measurement problems 
Glassman and Riddick (2001) suggested that home asset bias could be due to omitted 
assets from the investors’ optimization model. As the authors write, most of the researchers 
use past returns in order to measure the expected returns in a portfolio maximization. 
However, this includes some drawbacks and investors usually adjust these past returns in 
order to optimize. Firstly, transaction costs play an important role in determining whether 
investing in foreign assets is more attractive than investing domestically. Solnik (1996) 
showed that the transaction costs vary across countries around 1-4% per year. These 
numbers, when subtracted from foreign assets’ expected returns, could make foreign assets 
less attractive. Secondly, investors’ expectations play an important role in their investing 
practices. As Shiller et al. (1991) suggested, domestic investors are more optimistic about the 
returns of the domestic market than the foreign investors are. A third issue for adjusting past 
returns is the estimation risk, i.e. the returns cannot be precisely estimated. In their paper, 
Glassman and Riddick tried to examine whether these adjustments of past returns could 
justify home bias. They used data from Morgan Stanley for six countries in the period 1985-
1990. Their results showed no evidence supporting that the adjusting returns could justify 
the home asset bias. 
Then, the researchers tested whether the adjustments in assets’ variances could justify the 
presence of home bias. For example, if the perceived risk of foreign assets increases for some 
reason, then it is natural for the foreign assets to become less favourable. In order to see how 
much the variances of the assets should be adjusted, the researchers computed the needed 
adjustment by a combination of historical and extreme variances. In this case too, their 
results did not indicate that adjustments in variances could justify the home asset bias. 
Finally, Glassman and Riddick examined whether adjustments to correlations by including 
omitted assets from the optimization problem could justify the existence of the home asset 
bias. Such omitted factor could be human capital. Then, the researchers combine the 
adjustments to returns, standard deviations and correlations. Their results suggest that the 
characteristics of the omitted assets do not correspond to any known asset, and they exclude 
human capital, domestic or foreign bonds and domestic or foreign real estate. So, the authors 
conclude that the explanation of the home asset bias could lie under multiple omitted assets 
and left this explanation pending to further research.  
Diversification costs exceed gains 
Gorman and Jorgensen (2002) suggested that the theoretical gains from international 
diversification are difficult to be captured in practice by investors. More specifically, the 
researchers used both the Markowitz approach and the Bayes-Stein tangency “shrinkage” 
algorithm in order to estimate the expected returns and the covariance parameters. The 
results indicate that a 100% domestic portfolio performed as well or better than the tangency 
portfolios estimated by the two methods. Thus, according to the researchers, the home bias 
of the investors is not irrational but justified since they are not able to benefit from 
international diversification. 
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The interrelationship among the home bias puzzle and the equity premium 
puzzle 
The expected returns of stocks are higher than those of bonds. This is quite logical since 
one could expect riskier assets to have higher returns than safer assets. However, the size of 
the difference in the returns among these assets is what puzzling the researchers. This puzzle 
is called the equity premium puzzle and was first identified by Mehra and Prescott (1985). 
The excess expected return on an equity share of country m’s output is the following: 
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“Because annual consumption growth is fairly stable and the annual variability of major 
stock markets returns moderate, the covariance of consumption growth with returns, while 
positive, is too low to explain the huge equity premium unless the risk-aversion coefficient ρ 
is extremely high.” [Obstfeld and Rogoff 1996)] 
At this point is where the equity premium puzzle and the home bias puzzle come 
together. The question arising is that if investors are so risk averse as the risk-aversion 
coefficient implies, then why investors do not diversify internationally in order to exploit the 
benefits of international diversification and lower the risk of their portfolio. 
Conclusion 
The tendency of investors to hold the largest percentage of their wealth in domestic assets 
rather than exploiting the benefits from international diversification is called the home bias 
puzzle. Investors’ home bias has been puzzling researchers for many years and through time 
many possible explanations have been given for what causes the home bias puzzle. Among 
them are: asymmetric information, non traded assets, inflation hedging, several costs and 
barriers in equity trading, differences in expectations and empirical measurement problems. 
There is also an approach that the home bias puzzle is linked to the equity premium puzzle. 
Though, none of them has been empirically proved to be the correct one. The most 
promising explanations however, in my opinion, seem to be those of asymmetric information 
and differences in expectations. In other worlds, the solution of the home bias puzzle maybe 
lies into investors’ behaviour. If investors perceive foreign markets as more risky than the 
domestic ones or even if they think that can beat the domestic market easier than the foreign 
ones that can drive them to invest the largest percentage of their wealth in domestic assets. 
Also, it could be our models that cannot predict accurately the expected returns and the 
optimization levels of portfolios. However, since neither of these explanations has also been 
empirically proved, we cannot disclose any of the other remaining proposed explanations.  
For that reason, my conclusion is that the home bias puzzle is indeed a puzzle that is 
pending to further research and a testable hypothesis. 
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